Iran's Internet Blackout: A Nation Disconnected

Since January 8, 2026, Iran has implemented a near-total internet shutdown, the longest in the country's history, affecting approximately 90 million citizens. The government has cited countering "externally directed terrorist operations" as the reason for the blackout, which was tightened following US and Israeli strikes on February 28. Reports indicate that authorities may be using this period to implement a permanent system of tiered, government-vetted internet access, moving towards a model of digital isolation.

Technical Implementation and Scope of the Shutdown

The internet blackout began on January 8 amid anti-government protests. The disruption has affected not only internet services but also phone and text messaging.

Data from network monitoring firm Kentik showed that as of January 17, inbound data flow into Iran stood at approximately 0.2% of pre-shutdown volume.

The government has not announced a specific restoration date. Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani stated that international web access would not be restored until at least late March, coinciding with the Iranian New Year (Nowruz). Multiple journalists and internet freedom observers have reported that full international internet access is not expected to reopen, and future user access will not revert to its previous form.

Iran routes international internet traffic through a small number of state-controlled gateways, described by researchers as "chokepoints." The country has also developed an internal network, the National Information Network (NIN), which hosts government-approved sites and services and has operated throughout the current shutdown. This network is isolated from the global internet.

The "Internet Pro" Tiered System

In February, the government introduced a program called "Internet Pro," a tiered internet access system sold by the Mobile Communications Company of Iran (MCI), an entity linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This program offers whitelisted access to international websites for users who pass a government verification process.

• Pricing: A one-year 50 GB package costs approximately 2 million tomans (about $24), with additional activation fees. By comparison, ordinary restricted internet costs 8,000 tomans per GB.
• Target Users: The program is intended for individuals with verified business, academic, or scientific roles.
• Black Market: "Internet Pro" SIM cards have appeared on the black market, leading to profiteering.
• Official Divisions: President Pezeshkian's office has called the restrictions on global internet access unfair. Communications Minister Sattar Hashemi stated that the tiered system "has no validity." Hardline officials, including Mohammad Amin Aghamiri, have expressed support for the program. The program's backing originates from the Supreme National Security Council.

Broader Plans for Permanent Digital Isolation

Multiple reports indicate that Iran is pursuing a long-term plan to permanently separate the country from the global internet.

Proposed Structure

Under the proposed plan, access to the global internet would become a "governmental privilege." Individuals with security clearance or those who pass government background checks would be granted access to a filtered version of the global internet. All other citizens would be restricted to the national intranet (NIN).

History and Development

This plan represents the culmination of a 16-year effort by the Iranian government to control the country's internet:

• 2009: Initial internet shutdown during protests following Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's re-election revealed the economic costs of a complete outage, prompting authorities to seek more targeted control methods.
• 2012: The Supreme Council of Cyberspace was established to plan a domestic internet infrastructure.
• 2015: Researchers observed Iran constructing a domestically connected internet entirely separate from the outside world.
• Ongoing: Authorities used incentives like tax breaks and restrictions to encourage online businesses, banks, and internet service providers to relocate their infrastructure within Iran. The NIN currently hosts a limited set of government-built applications, including messaging services, search engines, navigation apps, and a video streaming service.

Technical Mechanisms

The system involves two main components:

1. Filtering and Whitelisting: A sophisticated system filters internet traffic, allowing select users access to the global internet while blocking others. This capability may have been facilitated by technology exported from China, specifically high-capacity "middleboxes" that can monitor, manipulate, and block internet traffic, websites, protocols, and VPN tools on a national scale.
2. Domestic Network: The NIN operates as an isolated, government-monitored alternative to the global internet.

Decision-Making and Motivations

FilterWatch, an internet monitoring project, reports that decisions regarding internet access are increasingly concentrated within security bodies rather than civilian ministries. Protection from cyber attacks has been cited as a potential motivation.

Amir Rashidi of Filterwatch stated that authorities appear satisfied with the current level of internet connectivity, believing the shutdown aided in controlling the situation. Computer security expert Professor Alan Woodward from Surrey University suggested the government may be using the current outage to implement long-term technical changes and directives for internet control.

Starlink Satellite Internet as an Alternative

Starlink, a division of SpaceX, has become a primary means of international communication for a segment of the Iranian population during the blackout.

Service and Accessibility

• Fee Waiver: Multiple reports indicate that SpaceX has waived monthly subscription fees for Starlink users in Iran. This has not been officially confirmed by SpaceX. The development followed reported discussions between US President Donald Trump and Elon Musk.
• Equipment: Starlink requires a receiver (dish) roughly the size of a computer monitor. These devices are illegal in Iran, are smuggled into the country, and are traded on the black market. Estimates of units in Iran range from 50,000 to 100,000. Activists report that devices are often camouflaged, sometimes disguised as solar panels.
• Operation: The system uses a constellation of approximately 9,000 to 9,500 low-earth orbit satellites. Satellite expert Jonathan McDowell noted the system's design makes it difficult for authorities to censor, as signals originate from satellites and do not rely on local telecom providers.

Legal Status and Risks

• Starlink is not officially licensed to operate in Iran. Its use was criminalized by Iranian authorities in 2022.
• Using Starlink devices carries legal penalties, including up to two years in prison and, in some cases, accusations of espionage which can carry the death penalty.
• Authorities have reportedly conducted searches on rooftops and surrounding buildings to identify and confiscate Starlink dishes.

Government Countermeasures

• Iranian authorities have deployed jamming technology to disrupt Starlink signals. Reports describe these efforts as "military-grade" and similar to tactics observed in Ukraine.
• Jamming efforts have been reported with varying degrees of success. Some sources indicate jamming is localized and authorities lack the technology for full suppression.
• SpaceX has reportedly issued firmware updates to circumvent jamming countermeasures.
• Activists and experts, including Mahsa Alimardani of the human rights organization Witness, state that jamming has been largely unsuccessful, leading authorities to resort to physical confiscations.

Impact on Information Flow

• Starlink has been used to transmit images, videos, and reports of protest activity and casualties from within Iran to the outside world.
• Activists note that the widespread use of Starlink has prevented the government from fully stifling information flow, a contrast to the 2019 protests where communication blackouts were more effective.

Reported Casualties and Impact

Casualty Figures

The Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) reported over 2,600 fatalities in Iran's crackdown as of early reporting periods. By January 18, HRANA reported over 3,300 confirmed protester deaths and more than 24,266 arrests across 187 cities. These figures have not been independently confirmed. Actual numbers are believed to be higher by human rights groups.

Economic and Social Impact

• The blackout has impacted livelihoods, particularly in the e-commerce sector.
• An Iranian business owner reported that his online training business was frozen and estimated nearly 80% of the businesses he worked with could go bankrupt within a year.
• The shutdown has prevented some Iranians from receiving warnings about airstrikes and communicating with family abroad.
• The black-market VPN economy has cost Iranians an estimated $1.8 billion over two months, according to HRANA and Iran's Chamber of Commerce.

Government Surveillance and Control

• Iranian authorities have arrested hundreds of people for internet use. In late March, six people were arrested in Yazd province for using Starlink equipment, and 466 people were arrested for using the internet to "hurt national security."
• Four Iranians reported receiving regular SMS text messages from government authorities reminding them that speaking to foreign media is punishable by arrest and property confiscation.
• Authorities have a history of digital surveillance, employing phishing techniques to access phone data.

International Comparisons

If Iran proceeds with plans for a permanent, tiered internet system, its control model would combine elements observed in other countries:

• China: Utilizes a "Great Firewall" to block much of the global internet and Western applications.
• Russia: Has developed plans for a "Ru-net" system, designed as a "kill switch" to enable internal internet traffic while disconnecting from the global internet during crises, though it has not been fully tested.

Analyst Perspectives

Analysts caution that the plans for permanent digital isolation may not fully materialize or could be applied inconsistently due to internal power dynamics, economic pressures, technical constraints, and the ability of users to adapt or migrate to alternative platforms.

Amir Rashidi characterized the implementation of such systems as primarily a political matter rather than a technical one. Concerns have been raised regarding the concentration of control over vital communication infrastructure, both by the Iranian government and by private companies like SpaceX that provide alternative access.